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ABSTRACT

The Effectiveness of Campaign Contribution Limits
In Judicial Elections
by
Cami Jones, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2012

Major Professor: Dr. Damon Cann
Department: Political Science
State judicial elections are becoming increasingly more expensive in terms of
overall spending. The growing visibilities of these elections are expectantly followed
with the support of special interest groups as well as individual contributions. This article
focuses on judicial campaign contribution limits and there effectiveness in accomplishing
their original goals. My research will address a variety of state judicial elections as well
as Supreme Court cases involving the effectiveness of judicial campaign contributions
have in accomplishing there purpose of reducing overall spending and preventing
corruption. My hypothesis states that judicial campaign contributions are not effective in
limiting the overall spending in a judicial election or in preventing corruption of
individuals.

(48 pages)
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Introduction
Why do Courts matter?
The United States has one of the most complex judicial systems in comparison to
other developed nations. The judiciary ranges from various levels of federal courts down
to state courts. The U.S. Supreme Court is the most nationally recognized court and
considered the most powerful by average citizens. However, it is often at the state level
rather than the federal level, which decisions are made that affect people’s day-to-day
lives (Cann & Yates, 2008:1).
State courts are structured differently than federal court system in the United
States. There are no two state court systems that are exactly alike (Champagne, 2001). A
major distinguishing factor between state and federal courts and from one state’s court
system to another that judges are appointed for life (including all federal judges) while
other judges are either elected or appointed for a limited number of years (Shepherd
2009:1757).
Judicial elections have received an increasing amount of attention over the past
decade. Elections mean money will be spent. Money raises concerns, and contribution
limits have been enacted to counter those concerns of the increasing amount of money
spent in elections. But do contribution limits work? My hypotheses address two
questions: first, do contribution limits decrease the amount of fundraising in judicial
elections? Second, do contribution limits stop quid pro quo exchanges? Both of these
questions help identify the effectiveness of campaign contribution limits in judicial
elections.
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Background of Judges, Contributions, Influences
In the United States each state has an individual court system. Although there are
similarities across the states they all run independently according to their own state
constitution. The main purpose of state courts is to hear criminal and civil cases (State
Courts, 2005) but state courts are also given the power of judicial review and have the
responsibility to interpret the state constitution and statutes. The federal Supreme Court
sets precedent regarding federal law that must be followed by trial and appellate courts
within each state (Supreme Court, 2012).
Each state has different regulations and selection processes for judges. Shepherd
(2009:624) states “recent trends in judicial elections—elections becoming more
contested, competitive, and expensive—may have upset the delicate balance between
judicial independence and accountability.” State courts are incredibly important for a
number of reasons. “More than 90 percent of the United States’ judicial business is
handled by state courts” (Shepherd, 2009:625). Decisions made by state courts directly
affect individuals across the country. Cann and Yates reference various scholars that
conclude the majority of judicial policy-decisions across the nation take place in state
courts (Cann & Yates, 2008). These scholars describe the significance of state courts,
noting that they handle a substantially larger number (nearly 3 times the amount) of cases
than federal courts (Baum, 1990:24, Glick, 1993:38).
While it is true that state courts process a whole host of
routine matters, they also handle some of the most volatile
and salient issues of the day, such as gay civil unions, the

Effectiveness of Campaign Contribution Limits

10	
  

death penalty, and equality rights in public school financing
(Carp, Stidham and Manning, 2004). Furthermore, in
certain instances, state courts have extended citizens’ civil
liberty rights (under state constitutional provisions) beyond
those afforded by the Supreme Court under the U.S.
Constitution (Latzer, 1991) (Cann &Yates, 2008:3).
Judges responsible for making such crucial decisions should be selected carefully.
Hall addressed the idea of selecting judges and contends that voters select the best judges
because elected judges are independent from the legislature and executive branch (Hall,
1984). Unlike legislators, who represent specific constituents, state judges pledge to
follow a strict code under the American Bar Association (ABA) intended to restrict any
type of bias or impartiality toward an outside person or group (ABA, 2007).
Citizens are limited in their ability to influence judges because of the ABA
restrictions. One action that individuals may undertake is to submit amicus curiae briefs,
providing special information to the court. This individual may not be the plaintiff or
defendant in the case and is only permitted to point out legal considerations that the Court
may not have otherwise considered (Amicus, 2012). For individuals who are not a party
to a case, amicus curiae briefs are the only legal means by which they can gain the
attention of the court. These briefs may raise issues, not already addressed by the parties
of the case but that may be helpful to the court (Supreme Court Rules, 2011).
While the methods of formal influence on courts are limited, interested
individuals and groups may indirectly influence courts by influencing the composition of
courts. One way this occurs is through electioneering in states that select their judges in
contestable elections. Elections, and particularly campaign finance, open the door for
potential undue influence on judges.
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Because of possible corrupting influences, ethical standards are set by the
American Bar Association for each judge to follow. Among these standards is a
particularly important dictum that states, “A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a
proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned” (Goldberg,
2007). This rule in particular distances judges from any type of outside influence or bias
or any form.
While there is very little room for outside groups and organizations to influence
judges, there may be ways to circumvent these limitations through campaign contribution
and electioneering. Campaign contributions have become a necessity in today’s election
process. Candidates typically fund their entire campaign using contributions from
individual donors and political parties (Skaggs, Silva, Casey & Hall, 2011).
Bonneau (2005) makes note of similarities between judicial and legislative
campaign contributions. Both candidates use contributions to “gain support, challenge
incumbents, and launch effective campaigns” (Bonneau, 2005). In studying legislative
campaign contributions, Erickson and Palfrey find that there is a comparable relationship
between campaign contributions and the votes of congressional representatives (Erikson
& Palfrey, 1998). This finding makes it natural to wonder if a similar relationship exists
between the rulings of judges and the campaign contribution they receive.
Campaign finance laws, which control contribution limits, vary from state to state
(Witko, 2005). Such limits were put in place with the stated purpose of two goals: First,
to indirectly reduce overall campaign spending and second, to limit corruption within the
courtroom. The goal of campaign finance laws sets the foundation to my research
question and hypothesis; campaign contribution limits do not effectively reduce the
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overall spending in a campaign or prevent corruption in the courtroom. We move next to
a comprehensive discussion of the rationale behind contribution limits and their
effectiveness in judicial elections.
Literature Review
“During the 1990s, thinking about comprehensive campaign finance reform
shifted toward equalizing political power” (Gross, Goidel & Shields, 2002:9).
Incumbents particularly have enjoyed a considerable fundraising advantage (Bonneau,
2005). Within the past decade, judicial elections have taken campaign fundraising to a
new level. Judicial candidates have nearly doubled the amount of money collected and
spent in judicial elections in the past four years (Cann & Yates, 2008:17, Skaggs et al.,
2011:5). Baum and Hojnacki (1992) describe an increase in funding and media coverage
as a way to better inform voters in a judicial election. Hall and Bonneau (2008) propose
in their study that increases in funding and campaign advertisements will increase voter
participation in judicial elections.
Bonneau and Cann (2009) review a wide range of literature investigating whether
quid pro quo exchanges do in fact exist between contributors and judges. They looked at
both partisan and nonpartisan judicial elections and conclude that in some states for
example of Michigan and Texas a relationship was found. In other states (Wisconsin)
there was no relationship between contributors and judicial decisions.
But campaign spending may have more effects than just possible quid pro quo
exchange influences. Gross, Goidel and Shields (2002) state, campaign contribution
limits were enacted to achieve a greater degree of electoral competition. Bonneau and

Effectiveness of Campaign Contribution Limits

13	
  

Cann (2009) and have found that, the increases in campaign spending have made
challengers more competitive with incumbents. They maintain that contributions limits
diminish competitiveness. However, additional opposing arguments hold that unseemly
campaigns and large expenditures have potential disastrous effects on the legitimacy of
state high courts (Cann & Yates, 2008). Many believe this is due to “the appearance of
quid pro quo exchanges between individuals who support a particular judges campaign”
(Cann, Bonneau, & Boyea, 2010). At least two things remain unclear in the literature on
campaign contributions. First, do contributions really level the playing field and reduce
overall levels of campaign spending? I hypothesize that they do not because candidates
may still raise as much as they like they just need to raise it from a more people. Second,
it remains unclear whether contribution limits really resolve the problem of quid pro quo
exchanges between donors and judges. We move next to a discussion of the general
campaign finance system and then devise a test that will answer these two questions.
Current state of Campaign Finance: Who contributes and how much?
A. Campaign Finance Laws
Campaign finance laws were put into place to help regulate money spent in a
campaign and to prevent corruption in the courtroom (Primo, Jacobsmeier & Milyo,
2004). Different than legislative elections, judges (according to the ABA regulations) are
to remain impartial and unbiased in all instances. By permitting the acceptance of
campaign contributions in judicial elections it opens the door to create favoritism or
partiality towards a specific individual or group.
In 2001, Republican Party of Minnesota v. White evaluated the constitutionality
of the Announce Clause (Minnesota v. White, 2001). Under the Announce Clause,
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judicial candidates were not permitted to announce their views on disputed political or
legal issues (Hasen, 2007:17). Although the original Announce Clause was dropped from
the ABA codes by 1990, various versions of the clause, such as the Commit or Appear to
Commit Clause were established in its place (Hasen, 2007:17). The Court stated in White
that the Announce Clause violated the First Amendment Right to free speech because it
restricted judicial candidates’ rights to state their opinion on matters of importance to
voters (Minnesota v. White, 2001). The Commit or Appear to Commit Clause restricted
candidates from portraying any type of commitments with respect to how they would rule
in a particular case (Hasen, 2007:17). A number of states have altered their judicial
conduct codes in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in White. It is because of the
removal of the Announce Clause that judicial candidates may state their positions on
issues. This ability to announce positions may make it easier for judges to win favor with
specific parties and win their support in the form of both votes and campaign
contributions. The repeal of the Announce Clause also makes judicial elections more
similar to legislative elections, making it easily anticipated that campaign contributions to
judges may have comparable influence to that observed in legislative elections (Erikson
& Palfrey, 1998).
There are many different strategies and approaches that have been taken to
address this issue of corruption and determine the appropriate level of contributions in
elections. State campaign finance laws vary from state to state depending on their specific
needs (Primo, Jacobsmeier & Milyo, 2004:4). Christopher Witko identifies and
categorizes variables that define campaign finance laws and there stringency in each state
(Witko, 2005). After reviewing his work, it is clear there is great diversity among states
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in their campaign finance regulations. This variation allows for further research to
determine the reasoning and effectiveness of these restrictions.
B. Amount Spent per State/Who Contributes
Judicial campaign spending has increased dramatically over the last twenty years.
Cann, Bonneau, and Boyea (2010) note an 80% increase in spending in contestable
judicial elections between 1990 and 2008. Candidates rely heavily on interest groups and
individual contributors to obtain the funds necessary to run for political office. This
spending is often concentrated in a few states, though; Skaggs et al., (2011:5) show that
nine of the twenty-two states (Cann & Yates, 2008:7) that hold contestable judicial
elections account for 90% of the money raised by candidates in state high court elections.
The dramatic uptick in campaign spending led former Solicitor General Ted
Olson, to declare "there is a financial arms race in judicial elections” (Biskupic, 2009).
Spending in 2009-2010 state Supreme Court elections reached nearly $38.4 million
(Skaggs et al., 2011:5). According to the Brennan Center for Justice, “nationally, nine
states accounted for $24.6 million of the $27.02 million raised by state high court
candidates (Skaggs et al., 2011:5).
The Brennan Center for Justice shows the division between spending and
fundraising per candidate in partisan and non-partisan elections.
Figure 1: About Here
The diagram shows that in partisan elections candidates collect nearly three times
the dollar amount that a non-partisan election candidate receives. The graph also shows
partisan races collected almost six times the dollar amount judicial retention elections
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collected (although my focus is on partisan and non-partisan it is very interesting to see
the comparison of all judicial elections). This figure shows that partisan elections play a
substantial role in fundraising efforts, specifically involving political parties whom
support candidates.
Looking further into whom these contributors are, the Brennan Center has divided
contributors into ten subgroups with the amount contributed per sector for the 2009-2010
judicial election.
Table 1: About Here
These data illustrate why concern abounds regarding corruption in judicial
elections. As you can see from the table, when contributors are broken down into sectors,
lawyers and lobbyists led with $8.5 million in donations, followed by businesses with
$6.2 million. Political parties rank third largest in donations at $3.4 million. There have
been large contributions to judicial candidates from both ends of the political spectrum.
These individuals have clear interests in influencing the outcomes of court cases. If the
three largest groups of contributors are those facing judges most frequently, it is easily
perceived that there is influence (Abrahamson, 2001).
It is also important to recognize that although this table identifies the top spenders
in the 2009-10 judicial elections, it fails to account for independent expenditures.
Independent expenditures by special interest groups and state parties were substantially
larger in the 2009-10 judicial elections than in the previous four years. “Such independent
activities accounted for $11.5 million, or 29.8 percent of all money spent to elect high
court justices. In 2005-06, outside groups represented about 18 percent of the total
spending” (Skaggs et al., 2011:5).
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The significance of this data is that with in the last decade the amount of money
and the sources of that money have changed dramatically. “Campaign fundraising more
than doubled, from $83.3 million in 1990–1999 to $206.9 million in 2000–2009”
(Sample, Skaggs, Blitzer, Casey, 2009). If this pattern continues to progress at the same
rate, the judicial system may face negative consequences in the form of corruption and
diminishing legitimacy. Campaign spending is reaching incredibly high levels; therefore
campaign finance laws are not fulfilling their purpose and need to be reevaluated.
Table 2: About Here
Given the amount of money involved, the question being asked whether campaign
contributions limits really achieve the purposes they were intended to achieve.
Legal Structure/ Federal Standards
Supreme Court Cases addressing campaign contribution limits and their effectiveness
The purpose of campaign contribution limits is clarified by looking at the court
cases that structure the campaign finance system. Over the years, the Supreme Court
gradually moved toward a system based on campaign contribution limits. The Supreme
Court cases evaluated in the paper focus directly on the effects and interpretations of
campaign finance laws, contribution limits and independent expenditures.
a. Buckley v. Valeo (1976)
After the Watergate scandal, Congress made an attempt to limit further corruption
in political campaigns by restricting financial contributions to a candidate (Buckley v.
Valeo, 1976). The opinion in this case, “limited the amount of money an individual could
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contribute to a single campaign and it required reporting of contributions above a certain
threshold amount” (Buckley v. Valeo, 1976). The Federal Election Commission (FEC)
was created to enforce this statute, and they continue to be a factor in cases addressing
similar issues.
Two major factors were addressed in the Buckley decision. The first was that
placing restrictions on individual contributions to candidates did not violate the First
Amendment right it was, they argued, necessary to achieve the compelling government
interest in limiting corruption. Secondly, the court concluded that limiting overall
candidate expenditures (or independent group expenditures) is a restriction of the First
Amendment right of free speech (Buckley v.Valeo, 1976). It is important to distinguish
between contribution limits and candidate spending limits in this case. The court
essentially allowed candidates to raise and spend as much as they wanted, but
contribution limits require them to raise funds in relatively small increments.
The Court ruled in Buckley that campaign spending is equivalent to free speech
under the First Amendment. Therefore, campaign contributions and independent
expenditures could not be restricted altogether but could be limited in some aspects.
Buckley v. Valeo led campaign finance jurisprudence down a long and complicated road
of campaign finance law cases. Nelson (2001:1) comments on the structure that Buckley
v. Valeo set, in the realm of campaign finance laws and how they are inefficient and are
simply “laws designed to curb special interest influence are merely hurdles over which
the adroit player of the system can jump.”
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The original intent on limitations according to this case was to prevent corruption
in the political system. Since the Buckley case in 1976, a number of cases have appeared
in the U.S. Supreme Court addressing similar issues of money being equal to free speech.
The Court’s decision not to limit overall spending in an election is highly unlikely to be
revoked in future case, though there may be restrictions on certain types of spending or
contributions. This decision not only set precedent on campaign contribution limitations
and independent expenditures but it also clarified why the court instated these laws
originally: the Court’s goal was to reduce the likelihood of corruption. Later, my analysis
determines whether or not that goal is being met or if it has adapted to limiting the
amount of money spent over time due the first goal of preventing corruption.
b. Massey v. Caperton (2009)
In a more recent case, involving campaign finance laws, A.T. Massey Coal Co.,
Inc. v. Caperton proves to be a critical case in terms of free speech and independent
expenditures. This decision has forced states to reconsider their campaign finance laws
and judicial recusal rules (Massey v. Caperton, 2009).
A state trial court in West Virginia, found Massey liable for $50 million dollars in
damages for tortuous interference, fraudulent misrepresentation, and fraudulent
concealment. Mr. Caperton pointed out that Massey’s C.E.O. made $3 million in
independent expenditures supporting Justice Benjamin’s campaign. Justice Benjamin was
the deciding vote on a 3-2 ruling in favor of Massey that overturned the $50 million
judgment. The U.S. Supreme Court called Justice Benjamin’s participation a
“constitutionally unacceptable appearance of impropriety” (Massey v. Caperton, 2009).
The court’s decision has potentially tremendous effects on future judicial contests. The
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Supreme Court held that Justice Benjamin should have recused himself from
participating in the case involving Massey.
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy who was joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, David
H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer wrote the majority opinion. The
Court held that Justice Benjamin actual bias need not be proved to require recusal, only
“a risk of actual bias” and therefore should have recused himself from the case (Massey v.
Caperton, 2009). The Court specifically mentioned the large amount of independent
expenditures that were spent on Justice Benjamin’s campaign and further discussed that
such a large amount of money calls for recusal of a judge from participating in a case
(Massey v. Caperton, 2009).
Chief Justice John G. Roberts writes a dissenting opinion joined with Justice
Antonin G. Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito, arguing that judges need only
to recuse themselves by merely showing a “probability of bias.” The Court’s vague
standard opens the door for numerous problems. The Court has seen a variety of cases
questioning the vagueness of campaign finance laws limiting contributions, adopted in
Buckley v. Valeo (Buckley v. Valeo, 1976).
c. Citizens United v. FEC (2010)
The group Citizens United fought against the Federal Election Commission in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, to prevent the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act’s (BCRA) limitations on electioneering communications from
being applied to the film, Hillary: The Movie (Citizens United v FEC, 2010).
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The BCRA sets restrictions on corporations and labor unions from funding
contributions out of their general treasuries (BCRA Section 203, 2002). The BCRA also
requires the disclosure of donors and disclaimers from each, stating the authorizations of
the candidate in which it intends to support.
The Court ruled in favor of Citizens United, claiming that Hillary: The Movie was
considered expression and intended to inform voters about Senator Clinton. The
information in the movie was considered constitutional under the First Amendment and
therefore the Court could not the BCRA sections banning independent expenditures from
unions and corporations (BCRA, 2002). The Court stated that the disclosure of donors,
“might be unconstitutional burden on the freedom to associate in support of a particular
cause,” however this was not the case in Citizens United v. FEC (Citizens United v FEC,
2010).
The Court’s decision in this case has become critical as judicial election costs
have increased in recent years. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote the majority opinion
joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justice Antonin G. Scalia, Samuel A. Alito,
and Clarence Thomas. The majority concluded that political speech is indispensable to a
democracy, and that speech rights are no less valid because the speech comes from a
corporation (Citizens United v FEC, 2010). “The majority also held that the BCRA’s
disclosure requirements as applied to Hillary: The Movie were constitutional, reasoning
that disclosure is justified by a ‘governmental interest’ in providing the ‘electorate with
information’ about election-related spending resources” (Citizens United v FEC, 2010).
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Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion argued that corporations are not members of
society and that there are compelling governmental interests to curb corporations’ ability
to spend money during local and national elections. Justice Stevens’s argument supports
the newly adapted goal of campaign contribution limits intended to reduce overall
spending by limiting the amount large corporations could donate (Citizens United v FEC,
2010).
Citizens United opened the door for corporations to have a tremendous impact on
judicial elections (as well as national elections) by allowing campaign contributions by
corporations and labor unions under the First Amendment. These newly defined rights
gave corporations and labor unions the opportunity to both influence and possibly corrupt
the state courts. All of these cases help emphasize the importance of my research and
support my hypothesis that campaign contributions are not effective in accomplishing
their original goals.
From Buckley through to Massey and Citizens United, contributions and
expenditures have become part of the First Amendment right of free speech. This
equation of money with free speech makes it exceptionally difficult to limit the overall
amount of money spent in a judicial election. I propose to develop hypotheses to
determine whether contributions limits reduce the amount of money being spent in
judicial elections. Additionally, I will explore whether contribution limits reduce
corruption.
Testing Hypothesis
Hypothesis 1: Do Contribution limits decrease the amount of fundraising?
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Donald Gross and Robert Goidel discuss a variety of campaign contribution limits
enacted throughout the 1990s. They detail specific limitations in each state. They find
that 42 states limit contributions from labor unions and ban corporate contributions to
gubernatorial campaigns altogether (Gross & Goidel, 2003). These scholars would agree
that limiting the cost of campaigns is the motivation behind contributions limits (Gross &
Goidel, 2003).
All of the cases we previously considered different motivations behind campaign
contributions limits. As stated in Buckley v. Valeo, campaign finance laws were created to
help prevent individual corruption and bias in the courtroom. Over time, corruption came
to be defined differently in cases such as Citizens United v. FEC. By allowing
corporation or organizations to fund candidates and label it as “informative to voters”
opened the doors and changed campaign finance laws and contribution limits by
classifying them under the First Amendment rights to free speech. Spending can no
longer be limited through campaign contribution limits. We begin out hypothesis tests
with a look at the notion that contribution limits may reduce overall levels of spending in
judicial elections.
Illustrated in Figure 2 below is a map, identifying all 50 states and the restrictiveness
according to Witko’s measurement. Witko based his measurement on campaign finance
restrictions on state statutes. Although this study focuses on only contested judicial
elections it is interesting to see the overall comparison of campaign contribution
restrictiveness across the states.
Figure 2: About Here
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Many scholars have tested whether contributions have effects on judicial elections
(Cann, Bonneau & Boyea, 2010, Bonneau, 2005, Williams & Distlear, 2007). However,
my first hypothesis test focuses on whether or not contribution limits actually limit the
amount of over all spending in an election. I focus exclusively on contested elections. My
research breaks down the amount of fundraising dollars in the 2009-10 judicial races and
compares the average amount of contributions raised per candidate in a state to the level
of campaign contribution restrictiveness in the state according to Christopher Witko’s
campaign contribution limit stringency measurement scale (Witko, 2005).
Witko measures his overall stringency score based on factors from various
categories including disclosure requirements, public financing and expenditure limits,
and contribution limits. His index is comprised of 22 individual items, eight items from
the disclosure requirements, seven items from public financing and expenditures and an
additional seven items from campaign contribution limits. Each state is given a score
based off the amount of items that fall under the state statue. A point is awarded for each
item found in the state statue. The total number from each category is added together to
equal the overall stringency score. The highest score a state could receive is 22. Arizona
had the highest overall score reaching 20, meaning they are extremely strict in campaign
finance regulations. On the other hand Georgia and Mississippi tie for the least stringent
state at a score of three (Witko, 2005).
The focus of my research specifically looks at the campaign contribution limits,
so I focus on Witko’s sub-score for contribution limit stringency. Witko bases his
campaign contribution limit score off the following seven items (Witko, 2005):
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1. Contribution limits on individuals
2. Prohibition of direct corporate contributions
3. Prohibition of direct labor union contributions
4. Limits on Corporate contributions (Direct or PACs)
5. Limits on Labor Union Contributions (Direct of PACs)
6. Limits on Candidates Self Financing
7. Limits on Candidate Family Contributions
For each one of these items that appeared in a statue the state received a point. The higher
the number, the more stringent the state campaign finance system. The lower the number,
the less restrictive the state is with campaign finance laws. Witko’s measurement scale is
sufficient for my research and satisfies the necessary requirements to test my hypothesis.
Although his data was collected in 2002, state campaign finance statutes (collected by the
Federal Election Commission), change only rarely and still provide a solid basis to test
the hypothesis on 2010 campaign contribution date. Differentiating from Witko’s focus, I
look only at the stringency of contribution limits and the level of money spent per
election in 2009-10 judicial elections.
Table 3 arrays a collection of information from 2010 contested judicial elections.
It includes an arrangement of Witko’s restrictiveness scale and the average amount of
money raised per candidate (including the number of candidates in each election) in the
2010 election. The data helps formulate a relationship between the effectiveness of
restrictions on overall campaign contributions and level of restrictiveness and the amount
of money collected per candidate in each state. The division of restrictiveness was cut
between Witko’s scale at the midpoint between three and four. This division makes it
easier to illustrate the different level of restrictiveness of campaign contribution limits
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and the average dollar amounts spent per candidate, per election, and recognize the
correlation between them.
Table 3: About Here
To ensure that the arbitrary choice of dividing the scale between 3/4 does not
influence results various divisions were made to view different outcomes. No matter
where we draw the dividing line between restrictiveness, the average for 2010 judicial
election spending shows the more restrictive a states campaign contribution laws are, the
more fundraising is done (with the exception of the 4/5 split, the difference actually
suggests restrictive states spend slightly less, though the difference is not statistically
significant). The table shows that campaign contribution limits are not doing their
intended job of limiting the amount of funding collected in contested elections. This
result could vary when including all state judicial elections, however this study focuses
on contested judicial elections and the amount of restrictiveness and fundraising.
Evaluate whether contributions reduce corruption
Hypothesis 2: Do Contribution limits stop quid pro quo exchanges?
Edward Keynes states that judges “are men, and they are influenced by the
communities, the societies and the classes in which they live, and the question now is, not
whether they shall be influenced at all, . . . but from what quarter that influence shall
come” (Boston, White & Potter, 1853:773). Along the lines of Keynes, I contend that
contribution limits alone are not enough to limit corruption in judicial elections.
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Several scholars have explored whether quid pro quo exchange relationships exist
between contributors and judges on state supreme courts. Cann (2002) Williams and
Ditslear (2007) find no systematic evidence supporting a quid pro quo exchange
relationship between campaign contributors and the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s justices.
In contrast, researchers have proven in a select number of states, such as Michigan, that
relationships between contributions and judges decisions do exist (Skaggs et al., 2011:1112). Michigan Campaign Finance Network’s June 2011 Report states, “the gross failure
of campaign disclosure in the Michigan Supreme Court campaigns creates a toxic cloud
that shadows the court’s presumed impartiality” (Skaggs et al., 2011:12). A number of
other scholars have found that while some states show a quid pro quo exchange
relationship, others do not.
According to the second hypothesis, if contribution limits are effective at reducing
corruption, we should observe corruption in all of the non-restrictive states, but no
corruption in the highly restrictive states. After reviewing various scholarship, I conclude
that contribution limits are not successfully fulfilling their intended goals to prevent
corruption.
Table 4 illustrates the relationship between the existence of quid pro quo
exchanges in a state and the level of restrictiveness in that state. If contribution limits are
really effective in reducing or preventing quid pro quo exchanges, we should only see
evidence-supporting corruption in states with few or no campaign contribution limits.
Table 4: About Here
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On its face, the table may appear to not support my hypothesis because Nevada
and Wisconsin are a “6” on the scale and there is no evidence of exchanges there. Nevada
and Wisconsin are unusual cases given the culture of state restrictiveness. Nevada has a
high level or restrictions due to the states gaming industry. Wisconsin on the other hand
was the founding state during the progressive movement and culturally remains a “Clean
Politics” state. Both of these states at first glance do not support my hypothesis with a “6”
Witko score and no evidence of quid pro quo exchanges. However, the evidence of this
study supports my hypothesis, that contributions limits do not completely prevent quid
pro quo exchanges.
The evidence provides mixed results in terms of quid pro quo exchange
relationships in judicial elections. Quid pro quo exchanges have been demonstrated in
some instances and not in others. My hypothesis clearly defines corruption, as quid pro
quo exchanges never being found in any judicial election. The table shows that corruption
is not being eliminated by campaign contribution limits as originally intended because of
the literature previously mentioned. We still see corruption in more restrictive states
proving that campaign contribution limits are not accomplishing their anticipated
purpose.
The second argument that could be made against my hypothesis is that, if there is
a high Witko score one could assume it to be less likely to see corruption in judicial
elections; but this is not the case. After review, my analysis shows that restrictions among
states, according to Witko’s scale and other literature, vary. Because a number of states
do not have literature identifying relationships this study is limited to review the states
that have been researched by scholars. Referring to the Table 4, it shows a variety of
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relationships. Georgia shows a mixed relationship. Wisconsin does not show a
relationship with restrictiveness (William & Ditslear, 2007), however Michigan has high
restrictions and shows a relationship with corruption (Skaggs, et al., 2011:9). Texas has a
mixture of evidence showing that based off individual justices there is empirical evidence
of a quid pro quo exchange relationship between decisions and campaign dollars
(McCall, 2003).
A few other states, including Michigan, Georgia, Ohio, Kentucky, Alabama and
Nevada attempted to curb the influence of money and politics on judicial decisions by
including nonpartisan elections in their system of judicial selection. Despite these
reforms, we see a relationship between the campaign contributions by attorneys to an
individual judge and the vote of that individual judge over time (Williams & Ditslear,
2007). This evidence proves that a relationship of any kind demonstrates that the goals of
never having a relationship are not effective.
Conclusion
The evidence in this thesis supports my original hypotheses, that campaign
contribution limits do not effectively reduce overall spending or prevent quid pro quo
exchange relationships in the courtroom. Although the data helps confirm my hypothesis,
it does not provide an alternative solution for campaign contribution limits.
So why do legislatures support campaign contribution limits if they are not
effective (Geyh, 2003)? The idea of symbolic politics presented by Lyons (1999:286289), discusses the importance of the appearance of policies. Drawing from Mayhew,
Lyons addresses two forms of symbolic politics; first, “statements of sentiment” and
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second, “decisions which legally establish real policy objectives, and which potentially
could have effects, but which have been designed not to achieve their objectives” (Lyons,
1999:287). Campaign contribution limits satisfy more of these points. Referring back to
Buckley, campaign contribution limits were put in place to make a statement about
corruption in government. Shortly after, laws were instated to help regulate the amount of
money spent by individuals per campaign to reduce the overall amount spent in elections.
Although both of these actions were valid in their attempts to eliminate corruption and
overall spending neither were successful. The symbolism behind these actions however is
what makes the difference and satisfies the publics’ needs for legislative action. The mere
idea of limiting the amount an individual can donate to a specific candidate helps
eliminate the idea of corruption. Legislative figures need to appear to be concerned with
the amount of money and corruption in elections by applying restriction that do not
necessarily work however serve as a symbol of action to their constituents.
Applying this idea to judicial elections, surveys show that people want the ability
to elect their judges (Geyh, 2003). Allowing citizens to vote in a judicial election satisfies
the people’s desire to be involved and have a voice in judicial selection. Because people
want to elect their judges, contribution limits and other regulations are put in place to
help prevent the appearance of corruption and/or impartiality toward one particular group
or individual (Geyh, 2003).
If campaign contribution limits are not effective at reducing spending or avoiding
corruption, then what could be done to correct the system? The following subsections
will discuss four possible solutions to restore the original intent of campaign contribution
limits and make a recommendation.
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a. Public Funding
The first possible resolution to campaign contribution limits would be to remove them
and publicly fund judicial elections (Skaggs et al., 2011). There are various types of
public funding systems. (Daniel, 2000). The first option is full public funding, sometimes
called a “Clean Money” or “Clean Elections” approach (Geyh, 2003:4). This would allow
candidates to voluntarily receive a grant of public funding in exchange for a promise to
refuse any outside contributions or spend more than the allotted amount on his/her
campaign. There are stipulations the candidates would be required to raise some private
funding to qualify for state aid. Because of this requirement it would eliminate anyone
from receiving public aid (Daniel, 2000). On the other hand, candidates receiving “lumpsum grants sufficient to run a campaign” opens many opportunities for individuals who
may not be capable of raising funds otherwise. (Geyh, 2003:3)
The second public funding option is partial public funding. Partial public funding
would allow for candidates to receive a set amount of funding from the state to help run a
campaign in exchange for a voluntary cap on overall spending (Daniel, 2000). Partial
public funding has the potential to match any private donation as long as it is within the
previously agreed upon amount (Geyh, 2003:3). Geyh (2003:3) mentions the availability
to match funds would allow for a larger spectrum of candidates that would not otherwise
have the means to raise such large amounts to consider candidacy. It is important to note
that providing even just partial public funding in judicial elections would help eliminate
the heavy dependence on private contributions, therefore helping to decrease the level of
corruption of judicial candidates.

Effectiveness of Campaign Contribution Limits

32	
  

Finally, the last option subsidizes contributors rather than candidates directly. A
credit, refund and voucher system would provide some type of government
reimbursement for contributors who donate to candidates, parties etc (Daniel, 2000). By
offering tax refunds and other type of government reimbursements it does not directly
help individual candidates but does provide government assistance to campaigns (Daniel,
2000).
Public funding helps reduce the total amount of money spent in an election and
eliminate the idea of corruption and quid pro quo exchange relationships in the
courtroom by donors. The problem with publicly funding elections is convincing people
that it is worth the cost. Many people complain about what they see wasteful spending,
particularly when it is targeted at certain groups or organizations. However, state judges
fill an incredibly important role and should be separated from any type of outside
pressure that may lead to impartiality in the courtroom.
b. Eliminate Judicial Elections
A second option is to eliminate campaign contribution limits by eliminating the
option of electing judges altogether and only appointing judges. This option satisfies the
goal of reducing the overall amount spent in elections but fails to do away with
corruption. The appointment process for judges may reduce the threat of corruption at a
state level but does not eliminate it. By allowing only the governor to appoint judges it
opens the door for the person in office to have complete power over the judicial system
with only minimal accountability to citizens. With the exception of the U.S. Supreme
Court (where judges are granted life tenure), state judges have a higher chance of being
selected on the basis of political factors or cronyism rather than because of their
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qualifications. This possible solution would need to be carefully monitored to avoid
further corruption due to the politics of appointing of judges.

c. Merit Selection
The third option is a combination of both appointing judges and elective selection.
This alternative offers an interesting compromise to individuals on both sides of the issue.
Merit selection would help eliminate the need for fundraising in an election. Selection
would be made based of qualification and experience. The state courts would base off the
U.S. Supreme Court method of merit selection. The governor would appoint a judge
based off their resume followed by a legislative vote for final approval. The main
difference between the U.S. Supreme Court and state court merit selection is state judges
are not granted life tenure.
State court judges face a retention vote from citizens. Appointing judges and
allowing them to face a yes/no vote satisfies both the people’s need to have a voice in
judicial elections and have the qualified candidates selected by the governor. Without
public funding this selection process has potential to cause serious problems with
corruption once candidates face a yes/no citizen vote. Corporations have the ability to
wait until selections from the governor are made and donate to that specific candidate in
deriving from the goal of reducing overall spending in judicial campaigns. Although the
amount of outside money collected in elections may not eliminate altogether it has a
greater likelihood to be reduced under this system. Merit selection is a complex idea that
would require a combination of public funding elections in order to effectively tackle the
problems money poses in regular contestable elections.
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d. No Limitations with Full Disclosure
The last alternative is to eliminate campaign contribution limits and spending
limits altogether but strictly enforces disclosure regulations. Opening everything up in
this way could have adverse effects on the judiciary. According to Geyh, (2003) people
feel that judicial elections are corrupt and contributions are heavily involved with this,
mostly because of the lax disclosure laws that vary from state to state (Witko, 2005).
Deregulating campaign finance laws and bringing more money into politics may helps
inform citizens and make elections competitive, but could reinforce people’s beliefs that
money influences judges’ decisions (Geyh, 2003).
My recommendation to correct this problem of campaign contribution limits is to
follow the route of public financing. As previously stated, every possible alternative to
campaign contribution limits has pros and cons. There is no one fundamental system that
can mend the problems created by elections and campaigns. Full public funding,
however, helps eliminate the dependency on outside contributions minimizes corruption,
and still allows citizens to hold judges accountable.
As mentioned previous, judicial elections vary from state to state and not all
judicial systems use elections to select their judges. Full public funding judicial elections
is the best overall solution to fix the problems of corruption and reducing the overall
amount spent in elections by reducing dependency on corporations and other private
funding sources. Removing outside money from judicial elections allows for citizens to
be involved with candidates and helps citizens pay closer attention to where their money
is going, Candidates would need to meet strict qualifications to qualify for public
funding.
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These qualifying requirements help preserve the integrity of the
ballot by ensuring that the candidates who are on the ballot have
some public support. In short, they prevent every single candidate
who wants to run for office from receiving public money (Daniel,
2000:3).
All states do not see the need for publicly funding candidates to run for a judicial
seat. I would recommend a requirement across all states would help eliminate the need
for contributions and donations in judicial elections. The problem raised by imposing
such a strict qualification for judicial elections is that the federal government does not
have the power to impose this requirement. Each state court functions independently of
the Federal court based off individual state constitutions and rights, which regulate state
court systems action. Logistics of this proposition would demand serious attention and
analysis to convince citizens that publicly funding elections is the best alternative to
electing their judges.
Judicial elections are becoming of more importance and receiving recognizably
more attention as contribution dollars continue to increase. Fixing the problems of
contribution limits is not easy and although there are a number of alternative options, all
have flaws. Future research could address, whether contribution limits matter at all, or if
judges develop a natural sense of bias over time without and favoritism towards
contributors?
In sum, my research suggests that campaign contribution limits are not effectively
reducing spending or preventing corruption in the courtroom. The results of this study
suggest potential solutions to this problem by publicly funding judicial elections, and
would help remove any type of outside influence on judicial candidates. There are a
number of unanticipated problems yet to be addressed. Given that judicial elections have
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seen increasingly high contributions in the past decade (specifically with contested
elections) actions need to be taken to fix the problem that campaign contribution limits
are no longer accomplishing. Judicial elections are some of the most vital elections that
effect day-to-day lives of citizens. By publicly funding judicial elections across the
United States it would allow citizens in general to feel a connection between the judicial
systems and help them see the impacts from their decisions. People want a voice in
elections. Publicly funding judicial elections satisfies the needs of the people as well as
accomplishes the goals originally intended by campaign contribution limits.
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Figure 1: Candidate Fundraising by Type of Election, 2009-10
(Skagg et al., 2011)
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Figure 2: Map of the U.S. According to Witko’s Contribution Restrictiveness Index
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Table 1: Contributions to Candidates by Sector, 2009-10
Sector
Lawyers/Lobbyists

Total Donations
$8,561,050

Business

$6,214,596

Political Parties

$3,438,699

Unknown

$2,864,698

Organized Labor

$261,430

Candidate Contributions

$1,878,836

Other*

$1,122,736

Ideology/Single Issue

$382,912

Un-itemized Contributions

$250,330

Total

$27,022,287

*Other includes: retired persons, civil servants, local or municipal elected officials, tribal
governments, clergy, nonprofits, and military persons. (Skagg et al., 2011)
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Table 2: Candidates Fundraising 2009-10*
Pennsylvania**

$5,424,210

Alabama

$3,164,615

Texas

$2,951,719

Ohio

$2,865,847

Michigan

$2,342,827

Arkansas

$1,965,962

Wisconsin**

$1,624,343

Washington

$751,180

Georgia

$588,251

West Virginia

$306,447

North Carolina

$163,718

Montana

$160,174

Minnesota

$152,803

Oregon

$100,536

Kentucky

$3,350

Total

$22,565,982

*Except as indicated, figures refer to 2010 elections, **2009 elections (Skagg et al.,
2011)
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Table 3: Average amount raised Per Candidate/ Witko’s score

Partisan (P) or
Non-Partisan
(NP) Judicial
Election
NP
NP
NP
P
P
NP
P
NP
NP
NP
P
P

State

MN
OH *
MI *
NC *
WV
MT
AR *
WA *
GA
OR
AL *
TX *

Number of
Candidates
running for
Office
4
4
5
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
6
9

* = $200,000
or > average
raised per
candidate

(National Institute of Money in Politics, 2012)

Average $$
amount
raised Per
Candidate
$33856.75
$700713.25
$468982.6
$207805.5
153223.5
$60717
$459594.5
$298445
$196083.33
$33793.33
$530834
$292492.55

>4
Restrictive

< 3 NonRestrictive

Total FundRaising (3/4
split)

$297,917.26 $263,300.80

2/3 split
4/5 split

$286,602.38 $285,706.63
$270,883.10 $301,873.78

6
5
5
5
5
5
4
4
3
1
1
1
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Table 4: Relationship between Witko’s score and quid pro quo exchanges
State

Study Found Relationship

Witko Score

States with relax Contribution limits
=Relationship

Wisconsin

No (Cann 2002, Williams &
Ditslear, 2007)

6

Nevada

No (Bonneau & Cann, 2009)

6

Michigan

Yes (Bonneau & Cann 2009)

5

Ohio

Yes (Waltenburg & Lopeman,
2007)

5

Kentucky

Yes (Waltenburg & Lopeman,
2007)

5

Georgia

Yes (Cann, 2007)

3

Texas

No (Bonneau & Cann, 2009)

1

Alabama

Yes (Waltenburg & Lopeman,
2007)

1
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